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Urban renewal and community development have a close and complex 
relationship with historic preservation. Historic buildings and neighborhoods often are 
the focus of redevelopment efforts, either as obstacles or catalysts. On one hand, 
redevelopment and land-use changes may draw the ire of preservationists by 
transforming historical structures, landscapes, or the character of a neighborhood. On the 
other hand, historic landmarks may be exploited as amenities to foster local 
redevelopment. This article discusses some of the challenges in identifying the effects of 
historical preservation policies and sheds some light on the effects of landmarks policies 
in Chicago.  
Many urban policy debates feature the historic character of the built environment 
and the extent to which it is preserved. Some advocates seek to preserve cultural 
resources, heritage, or identity. These less tangible resources can have substantial value 
to preservationists and society more broadly (see examples in Navrud & Ready, 2002). 
Other economic development interests may be more interested in increasing property 
values, expanding the tax base, and fostering transformations (of the built environment) 
that bring economic growth to an area. Historic preservation interests may conflict with 
these economic development interests at times. In other cases, historic preservation can 
enhance neighborhood quality and property values, thereby serving economic 
development interests. This argument is offered by “smart growth” advocates and 
scholars, for instance, who commonly recognize the importance of historic preservation 
(e.g., International City/County Management Association and the Smart Growth 
Network, 2003; National Association of Realtors, 2005; Talen, 2002). Community 
development interests also have a stake in some historic preservation policies, which can 
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affect the supply of affordable housing and even the social fabric of the community. 
Understanding the actual impacts of historic preservation policies can help guide 
policymakers in striking a balance between these numerous competing interests. 
Numerous policy tools directly affect historic preservation efforts. At the federal 
level, the National Register of Historic Places boasts over 1 million buildings and sites 
and adds over 1,000 sites annually (for further discussion of the National Register, see 
Schuster, 2002; Swaim, 2003). Federal listing is voluntary and carries no restrictions on 
private property, but it does make rehabilitation of some properties eligible for a 20% 
investment tax credit. Although federal listing is largely honorific, especially for owner-
occupied residences, state and local historic landmark designations may carry 
considerably more weight. Some local rules include financial assistance for or use 
restrictions of historic property owners, sometimes using the National Register to identify 
historic properties. In addition, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 made 
provisions for property owners to receive tax deductions for preservation easements on 
historic properties.  
In the local setting considered in this article, the Commission on Chicago 
Landmarks has been recommending landmark designation for properties to the City 
Council since it was established by ordinance in 1968. In the past 35 years, 4,500 
properties in 34 historic districts have been so designated. The Commission in the city’s 
Department of Planning and Development must approve alterations or construction that 
affect landmarks. They also oversee a variety of financial incentive programs for 
landmark owners. Owner-occupied residences are eligible for a 12-year freeze on 
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property taxes and waivers of building permit fees. Other incentives apply to different 
landmark property types. 
This article contributes to the literature by identifying biases common in previous 
studies and implementing a method to correct for them. This article offers more empirical 
evidence on the relationship between prices and historic designation. The methodology 
employed here allows for more robust interpretation of the effect or impact of landmark 
designation. Moreover, unlike previous research, the methods used here account for 
spatial dependence in the data and improve inferences about the statistical significance of 
implicit prices of landmark characteristics. This approach informs our understanding of 
the neighborhood effects of historic landmarks.  
Background 
One rationale for historic preservation policies is that markets fail to optimally 
provide for preservation (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Rypkema, 1994). Individual 
properties may contribute to the historic character of the urban environment, and this 
historical externality may affect the well-being of others in ways not captured by prices. 
The owner of a historic hotel may add to the charm of downtown and certainly to the 
quality of the view from apartments across the street, yet the owner receives no 
compensation from those external benefits. Thus, it is argued, policies are needed to 
preserve those historic characteristics.  
In practice, though, historic preservation may represent a very hard case for 
market failure-motivated policy. Unlike typical land-use spillovers such as smoke or 
noise, historical character might be construed as cultural or social capital. The possibility 
that the amount of historical preservation may affect one’s value of historical 
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preservation complicates the policy questions of entitlement to unrestricted property use 
or to neighborhood stability. The irreversibility of alterations to historical character 
complicates matters still further. 
In Chicago, landmarks can be designated for many reasons. The many purposes of 
the landmarks ordinance include preserving and rehabilitating aspects of the built 
environment with special significance (Commission on Chicago Landmarks, 2006). It 
explicitly aims to preserve neighborhood character, promote economic development and 
an expanded property tax base, prevent urban blight and reverse deterioration, and 
cultivate civic pride. Potential landmarks are evaluated based on several criteria 
concerning the historical, architectural, and aesthetic significance to the city.1 In practice, 
the landmarks designated in Chicago span the spectrum of eligible properties. Current 
Chicago landmarks were built between 1803 and 1967 (mean year of 1898). Over one 
third of them are on one of 13 architectural tours. Out of 230 landmarks, 37 are districts 
(e.g., Wicker Park, Bronzeville) and 15 are neither buildings nor districts (e.g., 
Buckingham Fountain, Getty Tomb, Site of the First Self-Sustaining Controlled Nuclear 
Chain Reaction).2 Objective measures of their individual significance and rationale for 
designation are unavailable. Informal inspection of the designated landmarks suggests 
that some reflect Chicago’s cultural heritage (e.g., Old Water Tower District, Union 
Stockyards Gate, Robie House, Carbon Carbide Building, First Church of Deliverance) 
more than others (e.g., Schlect House, Henry Gerber House, Wingert House). Each 
landmark may have been designated to achieve one of more of the ordinance’s objectives. 
Arguably, most of these designations were intended to preserve or enhance neighborhood 
quality, which could then be reflected in housing prices. 
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Historic preservation policies can have several effects, and this article focuses its 
attention on those values expressed through property markets. Restrictions on property 
use should reduce property values, reflected in lower sale prices. Eligibility for tax 
deductions and other financial assistance, on the other hand, should increase property 
values and be reflected in higher sale prices. Landmark designation that confers honorific 
status may also see that symbolic value captured by higher prices. Preservation policies 
also provide stability to a neighborhood by limiting change, thereby reducing the 
investment risk for other property owners. Frequently, observers cite intangible external 
benefits to historic designation, such as signaling “public commitment” to an area 
(Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991), solving market failure in “providing a sense of unity with 
the past” (Asabere & Huffman, 1994b), strengthening the “social fabric” of a community 
(New York Landmarks Conservancy 1977), and “catalyzing” rehabilitation of nearby 
areas (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Listokin, Listokin, and & Lahr, 1998; Rypkema, 
1994).  
Previous Findings 
Measuring these effects is an empirical matter. The scholarly literature has 
yielded motley results on the price effects of historical preservation policies. Leichenko, 
Coulson, and Listokin (2001) review empirical works in this area, showing how the 
“impact of designation on property values” varies across studies and across empirical 
methods. Several earlier studies (e.g., Benson & Klein, 1988; Gale, 1991; Scribner, 1976) 
use a difference-in-difference method to identify price effects of historic designation. 
This method typically involves comparing sample average property value growth rates in 
historic and nonhistoric districts. Many other omitted factors that differ between areas 
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may be relevant and better explain differential growth rates. More recent research has 
employed hedonic pricing method to assess the implicit price of properties’ attributes 
with historic designation being one of those attributes. Examples of this approach 
(Asabere & Huffman 1994a, 1994b; Clark & Herrin, 1997; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; 
Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991) control for many other features of properties yet also find 
mixed results. Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) claim that some of the variation in price 
effects is due to differences in landmark regulation at local and national levels. Leichenko 
et al. (2001) control for different types of historic designation and conclude that it does 
matter in some areas and that price effects generally vary across cities and sources of 
data.  
With over 2,000 local historic district commissions and thousands of diverse 
properties listed on the National Register, one might expect local studies to yield 
divergent results. Leichenko et al. (2001) find historically designated properties in Texas 
to have 5 to 20% higher appraised prices than other properties. Coulson and Leichenko 
(2001) find that local “historical designation adds about 17.6% percent to the value of a 
unit” (p.118) in Abilene, Texas. In Philadelphia, owner-occupied properties located in 
historic districts listed on the National Register sell at 26% higher prices than other 
properties sampled by Asabere and Huffman (1994b). Philadelphia condominiums with 
historic easements, however, sell for about 30% less than comparable properties, and that 
price is discounted by 4.6% per year after the donation (Asabere & Huffman, 1994a).   
The empirical literature has addressed the issue of externalities from historic 
preservation sparingly to date. It is hypothesized that historic buildings have positive (or 
negative) effects on neighboring properties’ prices. Coulson and Leichenko (2001) seek 
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to estimate the external impact of historic designation, using a hedonic price method that 
includes the number of historically designated properties in a unit’s census tract as an 
attribute of that unit. They find that each additional historic house in a tract in Abilene, 
Texas is associated with a sales price that is 0.14% higher.  
There may also be public-good benefits from preservation beyond the impact on 
properties and nearby properties. Several authors have sought to measure those public-
good benefits of historic preservation using stated preference techniques such as 
contingent valuation (see, e.g., Chambers, Chambers, & Whitehead, 1998; Kling, Revier, 
& Sable, 2004).  
There is a temptation to conclude that higher or lower prices associated with 
historic landmarks are the consequence of their designation. Without a careful research 
design, however, this conclusion may be unwarranted. Two problems arise: omitted-
variable bias and endogenous designation. Historic designation is likely correlated with 
other (unobserved) characteristics of the property. Higher-quality properties, those 
maintained better, or those in premium locations may be more likely to become 
designated.3  
Coulson and Lahr (2005) acknowledge this potential for omitted-variable bias in 
examining designation impacts. Their method, examining the difference in appreciation 
rates between properties in otherwise comparable (historical and non-historical) districts, 
stands to correct for this. Although they do find substantially higher appreciation rates for 
properties in locally designated historic districts, their analysis hinges critically on (a) the 
selection of comparison neighborhoods (done by the Memphis Landmarks Commission 
using undisclosed methodology), (b) appraisal rather than sales data, and (c) the absence 
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of neighborhood-level or geographic variables common to hedonic models. This article 
improves on this by looking at designations occurring between sales, using repeat-sales 
data, and including a broader set of neighborhood and geographic variables.  
Second, an endogenous designation process may complicate matters further. 
Properties in areas ripe for revitalization or in “hot” areas may attract the attention of 
landowners and local officials who support landmark status. Thus, buildings’ and 
neighborhoods’ price levels and trends influence the likelihood of receiving landmark 
designation. If we think that historic designation is assigned deliberately depending on 
site characteristics (e.g., price) and expectations about the future (Coulson & Leichenko, 
2004), then a selection bias may limit causal interpretations of many earlier findings. 
Does designating a home as historic cause its price to rise by 18%, or do high-priced (or 
fast-appreciating) homes become designated? The possibility of and problems arising 
from endogenous designation remains the subject of future research. For now, this article 
addresses the omitted-variable problem and robustly controls for the significant influence 
of unobserved quality on observed price differentials associated with landmarks.  
Empirical Method 
Hedonic Price Method 
Price effects of landmark designation are estimated using hedonic price models. 
Hedonic price models are based on the theory that houses are goods with many attributes 
and that the marginal implicit prices for the attributes can be identified by assessing how 
sale prices vary with attributes. Researchers frequently use hedonic analyses to identify 
the marginal price of changes in location, environmental quality, and other neighborhood 
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characteristics. See Rosen (1974) and Freeman (2003) for further discussion of the 
method.  
The first-stage of a hedonic analysis identifies implicit attribute prices. The first-
stage hedonic regression estimates the following general model: 
    Pricei = f(Attributesi) + εi     (1) 
where Pricei is the sale price, Attributesi is a vector of attributes of a house, and εi is an 
error term, all for the ith house. Equation 1 is typically estimated using a regression 
framework. The estimated coefficients for each attribute indicate the marginal price for 
that attribute.  
Repeat Sales 
The data in this study offer an opportunity to use a repeat-sales framework for the 
hedonic analysis.4 This approach has an advantage in that it controls for time-invariant 
unobserved or omitted attributes. Consider a semi-log specification of the hedonic price 
function for a sale of the ith house in period t: 
         ln(Priceit) = αt + βAttributesit + γInvarianti + δLandmarkit + εit . (2) 
Fixed effects for each time period are captured by αt. The coefficient β indicates the 
marginal price (in percentage terms) of the attribute. Also, γ is the marginal price of the 
Invarianti variables, representing time-invariant attributes of house i. The Landmarkit 
variable is another attribute of house i in period t, indicating whether the house is 
designated as a landmark (=1) or not (=0). Thus, δ is the implicit price of landmark 
status.  
Estimating equation 2 may not identify the “effect” of landmark status on price if 
some attributes (time variant or invariant) are correlated with Landmarkit and are omitted. 
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For instance, if landmarks tend to have high construction quality and this quality is 
something that garners a higher market price, the omitting measures of construction 
quality will yield a δ that is biased upwards. Taking the difference of ln(Priceit) and 
ln(Priceis), for the sale of the same house in periods t and s, yields: 
ln(Priceit) – ln(Priceis) = αt + βAttributesit + γInvarianti + δLandmarkit + εit –  
(αs + βAttributesis + γInvarianti + δLandmarkis + εis)  
ln(Priceit/Priceis) = αt – αs + β(ΔAttributesi) + δ(ΔLandmarki) + εit – εis . (3) 
As the time-invariant attributes drop out, the change in ln(Price) is a function of 
appreciation, the change in attributes, and the change in landmark status. This 
construction assumes that the marginal attribute price is constant over time. Equation 3 
can be easily adjusted to allow for β to vary over time, however. See Kiel and Zabel 
(1997) for further discussion of this “hybrid model” and extensions in Clapp and 
Giaccomotto (1998). 
In equation 3, the estimated δ coefficient represents the implicit price associated 
with a change in landmark status. By estimating equation 3 instead of 2, however, δ is no 
longer subject to bias from omitting Invarianti variables, even unobservable ones. This 
can be especially important for historic landmark properties, where some intangible or 
unobserved property characteristics may explain its different price rather than its mere 
formal designation. For example, if landmark properties have higher quality construction, 
special or unique “historic” design features, or extra prestige associated with them, a 
hedonic analysis using equation 3 that omits these difficult-to-observe variables (which 
are constant over time) will not bias its δ estimate. In other words, historic designation 
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will not be proxying for all of the underlying features that got the property designated in 
the first place. It will better capture the before-and-after price effect of designation. 
The hybrid repeat-sales model from equation 3 is straightforward to estimate 
using OLS. Letting Dit be dummy variables indicating whether house i was sold in period 
t, the model to estimate becomes: 
        ∆ln(Pricei) = ∑(αt∆Dit) + β(ΔAttributesi) + δ(ΔLandmarki) + θi . (4) 
The ∆Dit, for t = 1,…,T, is a set of indicator variables taking a value of 1 in the year of 
the property’s final sale, a value of –1 in the year of its first sale, and a value of zero 
otherwise. The θi error term is estimated using Huber-White robust errors.5  
Spatial dependence 
Before proceeding to estimate the hedonic models, the matter of spatial 
dependence in the data needs to be addressed. Just as Pricei and Attributei are not 
randomly distributed geographically around the city, neither are the error terms. This can 
lead to spatial autocorrelation, i.e., where the model’s error terms are spatially clustered. 
This is just one way in which spatial dependence may exist in the data, and it is now 
often addressed in hedonic research.6  
A spatial autoregressive (SAR) model can account for spatial structure of the error 
term.  (See Anselin 2001, 2003.) In this regression model, an N × N weights matrix W is 
introduced. W describes the “neighborliness” of observations to each other. In matrix 
form, the vector of errors, θ in model (4), is specified in an SAR model as: 
 θ = λWθ + µ     (5) 
where µ is an independent and identically distributed vector of error terms. The 
parameter λ corrects for the spatial correlation in the error. Estimating equation 4 with 
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the spatial autoregressive error via OLS involves a nonspherical error and leaves the 
coefficients unbiased but the standard errors both biased and inefficient. Accounting for 
the SAR error structure described in equation 5 can avoid these biases.7  
For this analysis, the W matrix assigns a value of 1 to neighbors within ¼ mile of 
the sold property.8 Otherwise, cells in W take a value of zero. Diagnostic tests for the 
presence of spatial dependence in the data are conducted as per Anselin, Bera, Florax, 
and Yoon (1996), clearly indicating spatial autocorrelation in the residuals from 
estimating equation 4 via OLS.9  
Data Description 
The data for this analysis come from several sources. Landmark information 
comes from the City of Chicago’s Landmarks Division of its Department of Planning and 
Development (City of Chicago, 2004). For the 193 landmarks and 37 landmark districts 
in the city (including 4,500 properties) as of July 2003, information on their date of 
designation, architect, and year of construction is available. Numerous sources contribute 
to the geographic data. The U.S. Census Bureau’s TIGER files (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2005) provide most of the maps. These are complemented by a map of Chicago’s 
community areas (Siciliano, 2004). The property and sales data come from the Multiple 
Listing Service (MLS) records of sales of all “attached” residential property sales in the 
city of Chicago from 1990 to 1999. These attached properties are typically 
condominiums and townhouses (in contrast to detached single-family housing, or multi-
family housing). There were 73,106 attached residential property sales using the MLS in 
Chicago during the 1990s, which accounts for a large share of all residential property 
sales in the city. The MLS records were sufficient to map over 71,275 of these 
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observations, although many of these records are missing valid information. As expected, 
many of the properties are concentrated downtown, near Lake Michigan, and in other 
pockets scattered around the city.  
Missing information for certain variables in the MLS data set has been dealt with 
as follows: Two key variables, square footage and year built, are missing from 24,835 
and 27,608 observations, respectively. First, the analysis is performed using the 
subsample of those observations for which no information is missing. This solution 
discards much information and, to avoid bias, relies on the discarded observations being 
representative of those remaining. Because of the well-established problems with listwise 
deletion strategies (see, e.g., Little, 1992; Little & Rubin, 1987), these results appear in 
the Appendix for comparison. Secondly, a multiple imputation by chained equations 
(MICE) method is used to impute plausible missing values for area and year built, 
incorporating some randomness to capture the uncertainty in the imputations (Royston, 
2005).10 By repeating this imputation several times, the resulting data sets are analyzed 
identically and their estimates pooled to obtain confidence intervals. This method has the 
advantages of using more information and assuming only that the probability of an 
observation missing a value does not depend on unobserved information. 
Despite the missing information, the MLS data have several desirable features. 
First, it captures actual sales and perceived attribute values of those involved in the 
transaction. Actual market data are superior to appraisal data in this regard, although 
sales data reveal prices only for properties actually sold rather than the universe of 
properties in a city. A selection bias is thus possible. Second, the MLS data records have 
information about a wide range of property attributes (e.g., list and sale price and date, 
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dimensions of various rooms, tax payments). Finally, because the sample covers nearly 
all sales of attached properties during a 10-year span, many properties were sold multiple 
times during that period. This allows for a repeat-sale approach. Table 1 contains the 
variable descriptions, and Table 2 presents the sample descriptive statistics. 
[Insert Tables 1 + 2 about here] 
Empirical Results 
The first set of results is presented for the hedonic regression using all sales of 
attached housing in Chicago during the 1990s. This hedonic model estimates equation 2 
for a large set of attributes of the properties and neighborhoods. Over 63,000 
observations have complete (or estimated) information for all variables. The results of a 
Box-Cox regression suggested a semi-log form for the appropriate specification – 
consistent with recommendations elsewhere in the hedonics literature (Cropper, Deck, & 
McConnell, 1988).11 Table 3 shows results for three different models: Model 1 is and 
OLS model with no community-area effects and no spatial autocorrelation, Model 2 is an 
OLS model with community effects but no spatial autocorrelation, and Model 3 is a SAR 
model with no community effects, but it accounts for spatially autocorrelated errors. The 
community-area effects control for each of 77 community areas’ average price levels. 
Model 1 serves as the baseline for comparison. Both Models 2 and 3 represent 
improvements in capturing neighborhood effects over Model 1. All test statistics are 
reported using robust errors. The coefficients estimated using the semi-log models in 
Table 3 should be interpreted as percentage changes in real sales price for the property, 
on the margin. Thus, another room or a garage is associated with properties that sell for 3 
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to 4% more. The estimated spatial nuisance parameter λ = 0.65 in the SAR model 
signifies substantial positive spatial autocorrelation. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results for each model indicate a good fit to the data. The R2 of 0.77 for 
Model 1 rises to 0.79 in Model 2. The estimated coefficients are typically significant at 
less than the 0.1% level. Each of the coefficients for property attributes and neighborhood 
characteristics have the expected sign. Bigger units with more rooms sell for higher 
prices. Prices were also higher for sales downtown and near parks and the river, not too 
close to Chicago Transit Authority lines and in areas with high property values, low 
density, fewer nonwhites, higher incomes, and older buildings. One unexpected result is 
the positive coefficient for distance to lake, which indicates that additional distance away 
from Lake Michigan is associated with a higher sales price.12 When community-area 
effects are controlled for, however, distance to lake becomes a disamenity beyond 3.6 
km.  
The variables of interest in Table 3, the landmark variables, tell an interesting 
story. Units in properties that are designated landmarks (buildings or districts) sell for a 
substantial premium over comparable properties (10.6% higher prices). Controlling for 
community areas, that premium falls to 8.9%. Those properties in landmark districts 
receive only a 3 to 5% premium. Controlling for community effects or for spatial 
dependence in the data appears to reduce the landmark premium as well as the difference 
in premiums between landmark buildings and districts. So far, these results are broadly 
consistent with much of the previous literature and conventional wisdom.13  
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The hedonic models in Table 3 also account for “neighbor effects” or the sale 
properties’ proximity to other landmarks. In Model 1, each additional landmark in a 
block group is associated with 1.9% lower sales prices for attached homes in that block 
group. This contrasts with Coulson and Leichenko (2001), whose similar approach finds 
that prices are higher with more landmarks nearby. Controlling for community-area 
effects (Model 2) or spatial dependence in the data (Model 3), however, accounts for 
much of this negative effect. The number of landmarks in a block group may proxy for 
some more general “neighborhood effect” not attributable to landmarks. Overall, the 
hedonic models in Table 3 show BG-landmarks to be neither an amenity nor a 
disamenity. 
Models in Table 3 also control for characteristics of the nearest landmark. The 
price effect of proximity to landmarks is sensitive to different modeling assumptions 
about space and neighborhoods. In the models with no community effects, the price 
effect of distance to the nearest landmark is significantly different from zero. It becomes 
insignificant after controlling for community areas. Although properties that are closer to 
landmarks might sell at a premium, that premium increases with the time elapsed since 
the nearest landmarks construction or designation date. This effect may reflect that 
recently constructed or designated landmarks are increasingly “marginal.” It might also 
reflect a tendency for recent landmarks to be designated in neighborhoods with depressed 
prices. 
As noted above, care should be taken before interpreting the results in Table 3 to 
demonstrate that landmark designation has an “effect” or “impact” on prices. Landmarks 
in this sample do sell for higher prices, 3 to 11% higher on average. Yet this may be 
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attributable to unobserved characteristics of the property that are correlated with 
designation, rather than the designation itself. Looking at repeat sales and estimating 
equation 4 helps control for the bias of time-invariant unobservables. A Heckman 
selection model is employed to correct for the likelihood that those properties that sold 
twice differ systematically from those that only sold once. As the error in equation 4 may 
follow equation 5, an SAR model is also estimated here. The OLS model serves as the 
baseline for comparison. 
Table 4 shows the results of the repeat-sales hedonic framework. For attached 
homes in Chicago, the MLS data has complete information for 4,150 properties that were 
sold at least twice during the 1990s. As is common in repeat-sales hedonic regressions, 
the explanatory power of the models wanes when all of the time invariant attributes of a 
property (e.g., vintage, location) drop out of equation 4. Nonetheless, Table 4 depicts the 
results of several repeat-sales models: Model 4 is OLS, Model 5 controls for the 
selectivity bias, and Model 6 controls for spatial autocorrelation. Results for the year 
control variables (∆Dit) are omitted from Table 4, but Table A2 in the Appendix reprints 
the full results for the Heckman selection model. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The repeat-sales framework offers limited evidence of the impact of Chicago’s 
landmark designation program on the value of attached homes in 1990s. Estimating 
equation 4 via OLS reveals mixed effects of nearby landmarks.14 On average, sale prices 
are 2% higher for each additional landmark designated in the property’s block group. The 
repeat-sales approach also reveals price effects of a property’s closest landmark 
changing. If that new closest landmark is older, then the property’s price rises on average. 
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Moreover, sale prices decline by 3 to 5% for each kilometer closer that the closest 
landmark becomes. The geography is such that less than half of the properties with 
changes in CL-distance had no change in BG-landmarks, and vice versa. The result is a 
complicated situation consistent with landmark designations raising nearby property 
values but reducing more distant properties’ values if the new landmark is now their 
closest landmark. 
Models 5 and 6 in Table 4 relax some assumptions about the error term yet 
provide very similar results. Controlling for the selectivity bias (e.g., homes that sold 
multiple times may be somehow different from other homes) does little to affect the 
estimated landmark effect. The selection equation uses initial attributes and sale price, as 
shown in Appendix Table A2. Interestingly, landmark buildings (but not districts) appear 
more likely to sell twice in the 1990s.15 The SAR model, which controls for spatially 
correlated errors, but not the selectivity bias, also finds a 2% increase from designating 
additional landmarks in the property’s block-group. Overall, there is at least some 
indication that property prices rose in block groups that saw more landmarks designated 
in them during the 1990s.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Historic and landmark designation can affect prices of both the designated 
property and neighboring properties. Much of the writing on historic preservation touts 
sizable gains to society as well as the property owner. Even in the absence of positive net 
benefits to the property owner, a sort of “taxation by regulation” approach to historical 
preservation might be taken. Landmark owners may lose a little property value, it is 
argued, but preservation is serving the broader public interest. Similar justifications are 
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frequently proffered in environmental preservation (e.g., species, wilderness) debates. 
Restrictions on property use are justified by the sizeable external benefits of preservation 
(Coulson & Leichenko, 2001). These externalities accrue from neighborhood 
stabilization, adding prestige or maintaining the “charm” of a neighborhood, and other 
alleged positive spillovers. Thus, lower prices for designated landmark may merely be the 
cost of achieving the external benefits from preservation.16 Regardless, the price effects 
of designation are a key aspect of historic landmark policy. 
 Numerous studies have tried estimating price effects of historical status on the 
landmarks themselves and sometimes also on nearby properties. Previous studies struggle 
with methodological problems such as omitted variable bias and spatial dependence in 
the data. Both of these concerns can arise in simple hedonic models in part because of 
inadequate measures of neighborhood characteristics. Lacking reliable estimates of price 
effects, the discussion over policy impacts can generate more heat than light.  
The results presented here address some of these problems and contribute new 
empirical evidence. An extensive MLS data set of attached home sales in the city of 
Chicago during the 1990s is combined with other geographic and demographic data. The 
simple hedonic shows, like many previous studies, landmark prices are higher. This 
premium is smaller if the landmark is a district rather than a building. Yet, these effects 
may be capturing unobserved characteristics as well. A repeat-sales approach is 
introduced to reduce the bias although the data limitations prevent identifying the implicit 
price of designation (for the designated property). The housing market captures 
designation’s external effects (to other properties) as well, and the evidence here is more 
compelling. The simple hedonic, once appropriate neighborhood controls are included, 
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provides only weak evidence that proximity to older landmarks is an amenity. The more 
robust repeat-sales estimator, on the other hand, shows stronger evidence of proximity 
effects such as a positive price of having more landmarks in the block group. Although 
these price effects may be an artifact of the sample, they provide some support for the 
view that landmark designation confers substantial external benefits to other properties.17  
The hedonic analyses presented here account for spatial dependence in the data. 
Given the intrinsically spatial nature of landmarks and the spatial clustering in 
designations, geographic measures like BG-landmarks and district can be susceptible to 
spatial correlation problems. Neighbor effects in the attached-housing market in Chicago 
are strong for price levels (equation 2). First-differencing can reduce some of this (time-
invariant) interdependence, yet some remains. The effect of spatial interdependence is of 
particular interest for landmarks, which are often touted as having powerful effects on 
neighborhood identity, character, and social fabric (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; 
Rypkema 1994). Prices tend to rise as more landmarks are designated nearby, yet this 
may represent the nonrandom designation process (e.g., designation may be drawn to 
booming neighborhoods, perhaps to slow development or because residents are more able 
to obtain designation).  
Several important limitations apply to these findings. First, these findings apply to 
a large sample of condo and townhouse sales in Chicago during the 1990s. They may not 
generalize to other property types, other regions, or other periods. Extending this 
approach to other property types is obviously a pressing matter for future research. 
Second, the repeat-sales hedonic framework here assumes constant marginal prices over 
time. Third, no effort is made here to model the designation of landmark status. Although 
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this article offers more robust procedures for estimating implicit prices, the endogeneity 
of designation remains the biggest obstacle to assessing the causal effects of historic 
preservation policies. Designation is unlikely to be independent of property and 
neighborhood attributes, both observed and unobserved. This selection effect in the 
treatment of conferring landmark status makes it difficult to draw inferences about the 
causal role of landmark preservation policies. Even if prices changed following 
designation, careful research design will be needed to ascertain whether the designation 
followed price shocks or vice versa.  
Conclusive evidence of the price effects of historic preservation programs is 
elusive, even for a single market. Properties in landmark buildings and districts in 
Chicago clearly sell for higher prices than other properties. Yet, we cannot distinguish 
these effects from other unobservable traits of the property that are correlated with 
designation status. Very little attention has been paid to controlling for these unobserved 
quality characteristics, a shortcoming addressed by the repeat-sales approach of this 
article. Doing so demonstrates the significantly higher prices associated with having more 
old landmarks nearby. It also highlights the limitations of making causal inferences about 
housing preservation policies without a better understanding of designation processes. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Hedonic models, with complete cases only 
 OLS, no community OLS, with community SAR, no communitya 
 Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Constant -789.417 -0.84 1204.829 1.30 -246.540*** -13.33 
Log-area 0.537*** 15.30 0.531*** 15.32 0.492*** 96.38 
Year built 0.001*** 11.90 0.001*** 13.84 0.001*** 12.79 
Unitbldg 
-3.8E-
05*** -2.95 -4.9E-05*** -3.82 -5.5E-06 -0.60 
Unitbldg2 7.3E-09*** 3.17 7.3E-09*** 3.51 8.9E-10 0.37 
Rooms 0.017*** 4.63 0.017*** 4.74 0.016*** 14.39 
Bedrooms 0.112*** 11.49 0.115*** 11.98 0.121*** 39.77 
Baths 0.167*** 18.88 0.167*** 19.27 0.173*** 47.51 
Master bath 0.063*** 14.57 0.064*** 15.45 0.057*** 15.96 
Fireplaces 0.043*** 9.61 0.041*** 9.11 0.052*** 15.03 
Garage -0.005 -1.17 -0.008* -1.83 0.024*** 5.77 
Parking spot -0.038*** -7.61 -0.041*** -8.55 -0.006 -1.20 
Waterfront 0.023*** 3.69 0.026*** 4.22 0.038*** 6.47 
Distance to CBD -0.083*** -18.10 -0.028*** -5.26 -0.038*** -8.05 
Distance to CBD2 0.001*** 13.16 0.004*** 13.92 0.001*** 4.43 
Distance to lake 0.026*** 8.48 0.014*** 2.80 -0.001 -0.31 
Distance to lake2 0.0001 0.29 -0.003*** -4.38 0.001* 1.78 
Distance to water 0.038*** 4.54 0.040*** 2.95 0.046*** 4.64 
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Distance to water2 -0.012*** -4.73 -0.016*** -3.13 -0.011*** -6.11 
Distance to CTA 0.094*** 15.31 0.073*** 8.81 0.054*** 5.50 
Distance to CTA2 -0.009*** -5.58 -0.016*** -4.83 0.001 0.62 
Distance to park -0.046*** -2.75 -0.214*** -11.84 -0.114*** -5.03 
Distance to park2 0.061*** 4.34 0.208*** 13.72 0.085*** 4.02 
Northside 69.095* 1.86 767.235*** 7.60 388.745*** 11.35 
Latitude 1.942*** 4.14 7.373*** 3.31 -9.279*** -11.35 
Northside× 
latitude -1.647* -1.85 -18.317*** -7.59 5.650*** 12.80 
BG-income 0.001*** 10.64 0.001*** 9.55 0.002*** 12.33 
BG-value 2.6E-05*** 2.75 1.4E-05 1.49 4.3E-05*** 4.29 
BG-density -0.001*** -7.78 -0.001*** -8.32 -0.0002 -1.51 
BG-nonwhite -0.236*** -22.10 -0.057*** -4.38 -0.064*** -4.41 
BG-year built -0.002*** -12.98 -0.003*** -19.53 -0.002*** -10.70 
BG-landmarks -0.007*** -3.28 0.005** 2.02 0.008*** 3.39 
District -0.225*** -6.69 -0.216*** -6.09 -0.305*** -11.16 
Landmark 0.235*** 7.17 0.244*** 7.07 0.320*** 12.13 




05*** -21.35 -7.3E-06*** -11.84 -5.1E-06*** -6.88 
CL-distance 0.001 0.31 -0.004 -0.65 -0.025*** -4.66 
Year 0.682 0.72 -1.541* -1.67 -0.007*** -13.06 
Year2 -0.0002 -0.68 0.0004* 1.71 9.0E-06*** 44.78 
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Community areas Omitted  Included  Omitted  
N = 42394  42394  42394  
R2 = 0.795  0.815  0.753  
NOTE: BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark, CBD = Central business district, CTA = 
Chicago Transit Authority. 
a Contiguity defined as all observations within ¼ mile, or approx. 2 city blocks. Spatial 
nuisance parameter estimated as λ = 0.648. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix 
Table A2: Full Heckman (Two-Stage) Model for Repeat Sales 
 
log(Price0/Price1) 
Regression  Selection Equation 
 Variables Coeff. t-stat  Variables Coeff. z-stat 
Constant 0.090*** 4.75 Constant 53.937 0.27 
Differences in:   Log-price -0.071*** -2.55 
   Unitbldg -3.4E-05 -0.72 Year built -0.0001 -0.23 
   Rooms 0.003 1.39 Log-area 0.008 0.27 
   Bedrooms 0.014* 1.75 Unitbldg -3.8E-05 -0.54 
   Baths 0.042** 2.17 Unitbldg2 -1.7E-08 -0.59 
   Master bath 0.017** 2.30 Rooms -0.020* -1.94 
   Fireplaces 0.019** 2.53 Bedrooms -0.024 -1.14 
   Garage 0.025*** 2.99 Baths 0.005 0.22 
   Parking spot 0.019*** 2.84 Master bath 0.076*** 3.38 
   BG-income -0.338*** -4.67 Fireplaces 0.129*** 6.54 
   BG-value 3.5E-06 1.55 Garage 1.774*** 33.65 
   BG-density 2.9E-08 0.60 
Garage×parking 
spot -1.863*** -33.96 
   BG-nonwhite -4.3E-06*** -9.26 Parking spot 1.926*** 37.24 
   BG-landmarks 0.017** 2.29 Waterfront 0.037 1.09 
   CL-year built -0.001** -2.24 Distance to CBD -0.038*** -7.39 
   CL-distance 0.033** 2.07 Distance to lake -0.027 -0.91 
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Years btwn sales 0.043*** 8.58 Distance to water 0.008 0.53 
Dij vector:   Distance to CTA -0.010 -0.48 
   Year=1990 -0.128*** -4.53 Distance to park 0.142*** 4.26 
   Year=1991 0.056** 2.27 Northside 0.175*** 3.09 
   Year=1992 0.056** 2.26 Latitude 0.049 0.04 
   Year=1993 0.039** 2.00 Longitude -4.352 -1.53 
   Year=1994 0.065*** 3.66 BG-income -0.0005 -0.76 
   Year=1995 0.017 1.13 BG-value -0.0001*** -3.02 
   Year=1996 -0.011 -0.83 BG-density -0.0001 -0.14 
   Year=1997 -0.025* -1.94 BG-nonwhite -0.245*** -4.26 
   Year=1998 0.008 0.56 BG-year built -0.002*** -2.66 
   Year=1999 0.080*** 4.74 BG-landmarks -0.011 -0.94 
Inverse Mills 
ratio -0.021** -2.01 District -0.313** -2.13 
   Landmark 0.255* 1.82 
   CL-year built -0.0001 -0.33 
 
  CL-date 
designated 2.2E-06 0.62 
   CL-distance 0.002 0.13 
   Year -0.217*** -28.83 
N = 4150  N = 59044  
NOTE: BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark, CBD = Central business district, CTA 
= Chicago Transit Authority. 
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1 The seven criteria for evaluating a landmark are whether it is identified with a critical 
part of city’s heritage, significant historic event, significant person, important 
architecture, important architect, distinctive theme as a district, unique visual feature. 
2 The landmarks commission associates each landmark with 1 or more of 21 thematic 
tours; only 11 landmarks are associated with no themes. The percentage of landmarks 
falling into these categories are: Pre-Fire Chicago (9%), Great Interiors (15%), Churches 
and Synagogues (7%), Modern and Post WWII (5%), Early Skyscrapers (10%), 
Subdivisions/Planned Towns (4%), Labor/Industry (7%), Railroads and Bridges (3%), 
Prairie School (13%), Parks (3%), Education (3%), Boul Mich (9%), Music and Art 
(12%), African-American History (4%), Art Deco (8%), Terra Cotta (13%), Innovative 
Housing (6%), Mansions (12%), The Loop (19%), Districts (16%), Abraham Lincoln and 
the Civil War (2%). 
3 In these cases, designation “follows the market” (Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991). 
4 Such an approach might be thought of as similar to the difference-in-difference 
approach previously employed in comparing changes in average sales prices across 
neighborhoods, except now we can compare changes in actual sales prices for the same 
properties. 
5 Note, however, equation 3 contains εit – εis , which may not be zero in expectation if 
equation 2 is based on the full sample of all sales (includes repeat and single sales). To 
account for this, θi is replaced with an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio (from a probit of 
whether a sale was a repeat sale or not). Controlling for this selectivity bias does not 
appear to have substantial effects on the results of interest to this paper. Nonetheless, 
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these results are presented in Table 4 and Table A2.  
6 Another form of spatial dependence, often called a “spatial lag,” posits that the 
dependent variable is endogenous or that sale prices of neighbors affect each other. This 
sort of contagion effect has been observed in residential property sales (e.g., Ioannides, 
2003) and can also be modeled. But this approach is beyond the scope of this paper.  
7 Alternative spatial error models are available, of course. For example, Pace, Barry, 
Clapp, and Rodriguez (1998) and Gelfand, Ecker, Knight, and Sirmans (2004) present 
explicitly spatiotemporal SAR models. For simplicity, the repeat-sales model estimated 
here takes a reduced-form approach. The error resulting from Equation 2 takes the form 
of θ in Equation 5, as does the error resulting from Equation 4. This can be interpreted as 
the spatial nuisance operating for both price levels and price changes, although the spatial 
process or nuisance (λ) need not be the same. 
8 Common weights matrices use adjacency or inverse of distance between observations to 
define neighbors. Given the nature of the data (i.e., each observation is a condo or 
townhouse, and many are geographically “stacked”), a spatial weight matrix based on 
distance bands is used. Here, all observations that are within a ¼ mile (corresponding to 2 
city blocks in Chicago) to the observation in question are treated as neighbors, and the 
remainder are not. Alternative constructions of W were tested here. Constructions of W 
based on a ¼-mile band provided the best fit. Given the size of the data set, 
computational limits narrowed the range of W’s tested. Results do not differ 
substantively across these alternative weights matrices. 
9 Different ways to estimate this model include maximum likelihood (ML) and 
generalized method of moments (GMM). This analysis uses the SpaceStat (Anselin, 
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1995) software program to estimate the spatial models. Due to computational limits and 
the large sample size (N ≈ 63,000), this study opts for the GMM approach. The 
estimation technique uses λ to find consistent estimates of β and δ but cannot make 
inferences about the presence of spatial dependence.  
10 The imputation of “area” and “year built” relied on the other variables listed in Table 1 
as well as values for: story number of unit; community area indicator; presence of a 
basement; presence of a basement bath; and areas of living room, kitchen, bedrooms, and 
dining room. 
11 The Box-Cox transformation yielded a θ = 0.065.  
12 In Model 1 and Model 3, lake proximity is a disamenity after controlling for the 
following amenities: being on the waterfront, being near lakefront parks, being near 
downtown, and being near any body of water. In light of these controls, the omission of 
community effects and variables directly measuring access to transportation, and the 
“attached homes” nature of the sample, this result may not be too surprising.  
13 Table A1 in the Appendix presents results without imputing missing values for year 
built and log-area. Relative to Table 3, the effects of landmark and district in Table A1 
have similar signs but are several times larger. The effect of landmark districts, found by 
summing the coefficients for district and landmark, is actually smaller without imputed 
values. Properties in districts receive a significant premium (2.9%) only when community 
area effects are included. Although districts have minimal effects on prices in Table A1, 
landmark buildings receive a 24 to 32% premium depending on the model. This larger 
premium can be accounted for in the nonrandom nature of the missing data. In this MLS 
data set, more expensive properties in landmark buildings are much less likely to be 
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missing key data than other landmark properties. Thus, the landmark coefficient in Table 
A1 is likely biased upwards as less-expensive landmarks are excluded. 
14 Unfortunately, even in a city as large as Chicago with an extensive and vibrant historic 
landmarks program, only 18 attached homes were sold before and after a landmark 
designation during the 1990s. The effect on its own price of designating a property as a 
landmark cannot be identified in a repeat-sales hedonic using these data. The spillover 
effects on neighboring properties, on the other hand, can be. 
15 The probit in the first stage indicates that many attributes of a property predict whether 
it will have multiple sales. Interestingly, proximity to and characteristics of the nearest 
landmark appear unrelated to the probability of being a repeat-sale property. If historic 
preservation stabilizes neighborhoods, it does not appear to affect the frequency of 
transactions for nearby properties in this sample. 
16 In his guide for preservation advocates, Rypkema (1994) asserts “the idea that historic 
districts reduce property values is blatantly untrue” (p.45). Although conceding that a 
district may diminish a single property’s value, he claims that the sum of property values 
will increase due to interdependencies. He also claims “not a single credible study has 
demonstrated that historic districts reduce property values” (p.46). Notwithstanding 
Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) and the evidence cited in Leichenko, Coulson, and 
Listokin (2001), this paper casts doubt on Rypkema’s assertions by finding some adverse 
effects of nearby and new landmarks. 
17 There may be sizable external benefits not captured by properties, e.g., public goods 
values. These were found in studies like Kling, Revier, and Sable (2004) and Chambers, 
Chambers, and Whitehead (1998). 
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Table 1 
Definitions of Variables Used 
Variable Definition 
Log-price ln (real sales price, adjusted to 1 January 2000 $ using Chicago’s 
housing Consumer Price Index deflator) 
Log-area ln (area of unit in feet2). Imputed via MICE. 
Year built Year unit built. Imputed via MICE. 
Unitbldg Number of units in the building 
Rooms Number of rooms in unit 
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms 
Baths Number of baths 
Master bath Master bathroom dummy 
Fireplaces Number of fireplaces 
Garage Garage dummy 
Parking spot Parking spot dummy 
Waterfront Waterfront dummy 
Distance to CBD Distance to State and Monroe downtown (km) 
Distance to lake Distance to Lake Michigan (km) 
Distance to water Distance to nearest river or lake (km) 
Distance to CTA Distance to nearest CTA rail line (km) 
Distance to park Distance to nearest park (km) 
Northside Northern half of the city dummy 
Latitude Decimal degrees north 
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BG-income Median household income (in $1000s), block-group, estimateda 
BG-value Median house value (in $1000s), block-group, estimateda 
BG-density Population density (1000s/km2), block-group, estimateda 
BG-nonwhite Percentage non-white, block-group, estimateda 
BG-year built Median year built for residences, block-group, estimateda 
BG-landmarks Number of landmarks in the block-group at time of sale 
District Property is inside a landmark district dummy 
Landmark Property is designated a landmark (includes properties in districts) 
dummy 
CL-year built Year built of closest landmark 
CL-date designated Date (in days) of designation of closest landmark 
CL-distance Distance to closest landmark (km) 
Year Year of sale 
 
a These block-group characteristics were estimated for the sale year using a linear 
interpolation of the 1990 and 2000 Census estimates for each block group. 
NOTE:   MICE imputation uses other variables listed in this table and values for: story 
number of unit; community area indicator; presence of a basement; presence of a 
basement bath; and areas of living room, kitchen, bedrooms, and dining room.   
BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark, CBD = Central business district, CTA = 




Variable  N mean standard deviation 
Real price 63219  $ 181,570.30 158456.30 
Log-price 63219 11.88 0.66 
Log-area 63219 7.11 0.45 
Year built 63219 1960.46 30.73 
Unitbldg 63219 143.37 229.37 
Rooms 63219 4.76 1.68 
Bedrooms 63219 1.87 0.79 
Baths 63219 1.54 0.65 
Master bath 63219 0.48 0.50 
Fireplaces 63219 0.31 0.52 
Garage 63219 0.36 0.48 
Parking spot 63219 0.18 0.39 
Waterfront 63219 0.07 0.25 
Distance to CBD 63219 7.33 5.42 
Distance to lake 63219 2.27 3.71 
Distance to water 63219 0.91 0.85 
Distance to CTA 63219 0.76 0.78 
Distance to park 63219 0.42 0.33 
Northside 63219 0.91 0.29 
Latitude 63219 41.93 0.05 
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BG-income 63219 48.33 22.37 
BG-value 63219 308.85 221.19 
BG-density 63219 35.40 23.46 
BG-nonwhite 63219 0.34 0.25 
BG-year built 63219 1954.72 13.23 
BG-landmarks 63219 0.57 0.92 
District 63219 0.04 0.18 
Landmark 63219 0.04 0.19 
CL-year built 63219 1891.72 24.00 
CL-date designated 63219 8769.28 2809.73 
CL-distance 63219 0.74 1.04 
Year 63219 1995.55 2.76 
NOTE: BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark, CBD = Central business district, 
CTA = Chicago Transit Authority. 
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Table 3 
Hedonic Regressions for All Attached Home Sales: Chicago, 1990-1999 
 Model 1: OLS Model 2: OLS Model 3: SARa 
 Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Constant 2516.004*** 2.86 4466.673*** 5.26 -32.884*** -3.05 
Log-area 0.186*** 25.52 0.187*** 25.52 0.322*** 72.28 
Year built 0.0002*** 4.32 0.0003*** 5.30 0.001*** 10.45 
Unitbldg 0.0001*** -9.72 -0.0001*** -10.18 -0.0001*** -7.16 
Unitbldg2 1.9E-08*** 6.46 1.8E-08*** 6.91 9.7E-09*** 4.25 
Rooms 0.037*** 6.29 0.037*** 6.24 0.029*** 28.98 
Bedrooms 0.148*** 8.90 0.153*** 8.73 0.117*** 47.67 
Baths 0.257*** 26.85 0.254*** 25.32 0.215*** 66.94 
Master bath 0.089*** 24.66 0.089*** 25.46 0.063*** 19.73 
Fireplaces 0.088*** 24.06 0.077*** 20.93 0.074*** 24.52 
Garage 0.037*** 9.63 0.033*** 8.66 0.044*** 12.33 
Parking spot -0.025*** -5.85 -0.025*** -6.08 0.002 0.65 
Waterfront 0.026*** 4.44 0.034*** 5.72 0.046*** 8.47 
Distance to CBD -0.089*** -25.54 -0.035*** -6.66 -0.081*** -24.81 
Distance to CBD2 0.001*** 18.56 0.004*** 14.94 0.001*** 12.46 
Distance to Lake 0.032*** 14.68 0.027*** 7.05 0.037*** 12.60 
Distance to Lake2 -0.0002* -1.72 -0.004*** -11.35 -0.0004** -2.46 
Distance to water -0.008 -1.58 0.010 1.05 -0.011* -1.72 
Distance to water2 -0.004*** -4.10 -0.010*** -3.23 -0.007*** -7.80 
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Distance to CTA 0.060*** 13.04 0.062*** 9.02 0.021*** 3.42 
Distance to CTA2 -0.005*** -6.94 -0.013*** -5.81 0.001 1.02 
Distance to park -0.057*** -3.82 -0.153*** -9.48 -0.084*** -4.55 
Distance to park2 0.107*** 8.29 0.180*** 13.20 0.101*** 6.07 
Northside 40.221 1.55 560.010*** 10.24 -4.119 -0.19 
Latitude 1.486*** 4.80 3.446*** 3.12 0.102 0.20 
Northside× 
latitude -0.957 -1.55 -13.368*** -10.24 0.597** 2.33 
BG-income 0.001*** 9.11 0.001*** 7.55 0.001*** 11.14 
BG-value 3.7E-05*** 4.42 1.2E-05 1.35 7.3E-05*** 8.06 
BG-density -0.001*** -16.07 -0.001*** -16.37 -0.0003*** -3.76 
BG-nonwhite -0.295*** -32.28 -0.093*** -7.91 -0.231*** -20.51 
BG-year built -0.002*** -13.89 -0.003*** -19.69 -0.002*** -12.23 
BG-landmarks -0.019*** -9.92 -0.003 -1.48 -0.002 -0.72 
District -0.077*** -2.82 -0.039 -1.33 -0.028 -1.35 
Landmark 0.106*** 4.09 0.089*** 3.13 0.065*** 3.16 
CL-year built 1.4E-05 0.22 -0.0002*** -3.16 -0.001*** -7.77 
CL-date 
designated -1.2E-05*** -21.74 -7.0E-06*** -12.05 -5.2E-06*** -8.19 
CL-distance -0.017*** -7.19 -0.006 -1.25 -0.011*** -3.71 
Year -2.605*** -2.96 -4.639*** -5.47 -0.007*** -15.94 
Year2 0.001*** 3.00 0.001*** 5.51 8.9E-06*** 50.88 
Community areas Omitted  Included  Omitted  
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N = 63219  63219  63219  
R2 = 0.765  0.787  0.734  
NOTE: BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark, CBD = Central business district, CTA = 
Chicago Transit Authority. 
a Contiguity defined as all observations within ¼ mile, or approx. 2 city blocks. Spatial nuisance 
parameter estimated as λ = 0.648. 




Repeat-Sales Hedonic Models 
 Model 4: OLS Model 5: Heckmana Model 6: SARb 
 Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Constant 0.051*** 9.29 0.090*** 4.75 0.050*** 8.07 
Differences in:       
   Unitbldg -3.4E-05 -0.71 -3.4E-05 -0.72 -3.3E-05 -1.01 
   Rooms 0.004 1.47 0.003 1.39 0.005** 2.47 
   Bedrooms 0.015* 1.78 0.014* 1.75 0.014*** 2.80 
   Baths 0.042** 2.17 0.042** 2.17 0.041*** 3.47 
   Master bath 0.016** 2.25 0.017** 2.30 0.012* 1.96 
   Fireplaces 0.018** 2.39 0.019** 2.53 0.022*** 3.00 
   Garage 0.024*** 2.89 0.025*** 2.99 0.021*** 2.82 
   Parking spot 0.016** 2.55 0.019*** 2.84 0.018*** 2.99 
   BG-income -0.364*** -5.10 -0.338*** -4.67 -0.363*** -4.68 
   BG-value 3.63E-06 1.63 3.45E-06 1.55 3.2E-06 1.55 
   BG-density 3.75E-08 0.77 2.9E-08 0.60 -9.5E-10 -0.02 







   BG-landmarks 0.018** 2.37 0.017** 2.29 0.020** 2.35 
   CL-year built -0.001** -2.31 -0.001** -2.24 -0.001** -2.13 
   CL-distance 0.034** 2.11 0.033** 2.07 0.047*** 2.91 
Years btwn sales 0.045*** 8.95 0.043*** 8.58 0.042*** 9.60 
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 Year indicators Included  Included  Included  
 Inverse Mills 
ratio   -0.021** -2.01   
 N=4150 R2=0.20 N=4150  N=4150 R2=0.19 
NOTE: BG = Block group, CL = Closest landmark. 
a Heckman model estimated via two-step procedure using MICE methods (because the 
selection equation includes the imputed year built and log-area). A Heckman selection 
model with listwise deletion yields comparable results. 
b Contiguity defined as all observations within ¼ mile, or approximately 2 city blocks. 
Spatial nuisance parameter estimated as λ = 0.376. Moran’s I = 0.085*** (Moran, 1950). 
Robust LM(error) = 35.05 (p-value < 0.0001). 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. 
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